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Abstract: 
This study investigates the effects generated by myopic and present-biased preferences in the context of 
resource harvesting, specifically on the impact that the present bias has on the agent’s welfare when the 
agent is engaged in an intertemporal harvesting activity from a stock of renewable resources. The harvesting 
activity, in this context, poses a conflict between the long-run benefit of the agent and the short-run desire. 
The paper assumes there is evidence of the existence of a dual system of response to short and long-term 
stimuli. Thus, the study shows and argues that in the decision-making that involves intertemporal choices in 
renewable resources management, the naive behavior, strongly influenced by the emotional-affective system, 
leads to a reduction in the lifetime utility enjoyed by the individual because of the present bias. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Intertemporal resources management is frequently subjected to risks of inefficiency and mistakes. 
Often people face difficulties in defining intertemporal choices and consistently allocating 
consumption over time. Defining consistent decisions over the time implies the adoption of the 
conventional exponential discount, where the future benefits are discounted at a constant rate. A 
discount rate that differs from the exponential one generates time-inconsistent plans and myopic 
behaviors (Strotz, 1956). Unfortunately, people often behave contradictory to the time-consistency 
assumption. In fact, there is a wide range of studies that underline the existence of non-compliant 
behaviors to the precepts of time consistency - for a review Loewenstein & Pralec (1992) and 
Frederick, et al. (2002). Controlled experiments in the laboratory have shown that people exhibit a 
systematic tendency to discount the near future more than the distant one (Loewenstein & Pralec, 
1992). This depends on the impulsive behaviors of people in following the short-run benefit despite 
its effects in the long run. Furthermore, the intertemporal choices seem to be better represented by 
hyperbolic discounting rather than by the exponential one (Laibson, 1997), implying that people 
make short-sighted decisions where costs and benefits are involved. These kinds of behaviors are 
interpreted as a lack of self-control or present-biased preferences (O'Donoghue & Rabin, 1999; 
Laibson, 1997). 
 
This study responds to the difficulty of questioning the effects generated by myopic and present-
biased preferences in the context of resource harvesting, specifically on the impact that the present 
bias has on the agent’s welfare. The focus is on the harvesting activities from a stock of renewable 
resources in which the present bias can be an element of significant impact, particularly when the 
harvesting activity poses in conflict the long-run benefit with the short-run desire. 
 
In the last few years, some studies have started to explore the application of the non-constant 
discount rate in resource management (Settle & Shogren, 2004) and the environment (Brekke & 
Jhoansson-Stenman, 2008; Karp, 2005), discussing some issues related to the present-biased 
preferences in these contexts — in particular, the dichotomy between the biased agents and rational 
ones (Winkler, 2006; Hepburn, et al., 2010). However, the effect of present bias on agent welfare in 
the field of resources management has not yet been presented. For these reasons, this paper will 
show that a strict relation between the present-biased behavior and the agent’s welfare exists in this 
context, and it is strictly related to the nature of present-biased behaviors as phenomena that are 
derived by a dual system of discounting with the agent’s cognitive foundation. 
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2. A retrospective on time inconsistency and present bias 
 
Standard economic models usually assume that the agent discounts the future at a constant 
exponential rate. This assumption guarantees the time consistency of the intertemporal choices such 
that choices planned and derived from the maximization of the present value are still optimal in the 
future when they are effectively taken. Time consistency is guaranteed by the independence of the 
discount rate from the time. However, theoretical and experimental studies have widely shown a 
higher discount rate over the short time and a lower discount rate in the distant one (Frederick et al., 
2002; Laibson, 1997). The time dependence of the discount rate could generate preference reversal, 
which implies that the preference ordering defined at a given time can be reversed in the future. 
Impulsivity and misevaluations of immediate rewards are included between the behavioral and 
cognitive origins of the preference reversal (Ainslie, 1992; Shefrin & Thaler, 1988; Benabou & 
Pycia, 2002). Therefore, preference reversal generates a conflict between long-run preferences and 
immediate choices, which consequently creates a conflict between the initial intentions of the agent 
and the choices implemented.  
Preference reversal is coherent with the behavior of agents that show diminishing impatience such 
that the future is discounted with a declining discount rate (Hepburn, et al., 2010). Evidence of this 
kind of behavior is widely reported (Thaler, 1981; Della Vigna, 2009; Frederick, et al., 2002), and 
several observations clarify that time affects the choices in a manner such that a violation of the 
stationary postulate of Koopmans (1960) occurs — a violation that generates time inconsistency 
because an optimal choice at time t cannot still be optimal when the task is verified at a time that 
follows t (Strotz, 1956). 
Preference reversal, impulsive choices, and impatience in front of immediate rewards can be 
explicated by the presence of a hyperbolic discount (Ainslie, 2005).1 It is also usual to define with 
present bias the baseline behavior that derives from hyperbolic or quasi-hyperbolic discounting: 
greater impatience in the short run with a declining discount rate for a more distant future. 
Present-biased preferences imply that immediate benefits lead the choices despite the long-run 
interest; therefore, present-biased preferences can lead the agent to myopic decisions. Present biased 
preferences are widely observed in several frameworks, such as, the low saving rate (Ashraf, et al., 
2006; Harris & Laibon, 2001; Laibson, 1997; Laibson, et al., 1998); health contexts (Pol & Cairns, 
2002); drug, smoking or buying addictions (Gruber & Koszegi, 2001; Thaler & Shefrin, 1981; 
Wertenbroch, 1998; Frederick, et al., 2002); and procrastinating behaviors (O'Donoghue & Rabin, 
1999; Bernabou & Tirole, 2003). Furthermore, Cropper and Laibson (1998) have analyzed the non-
                                                 
1 Or quasi-hyperbolic discount. 
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Pareto efficiency in the issue of project evaluation when agents have inconsistent plans. 
 
There are some contributions to the literature that show how the non-constant discount interacts 
with resource management and climate change policy. Settle and Shogren (2004) explored the 
application of the hyperbolic discount rather than the constant one in the context of natural resource 
management. Karp (2005) analyzed the role of the hyperbolic discount in a model of global 
warming, and Brekke and Jhoansson-Stenman (2008) analyzed the contribution of behavioral 
economics in the field of climate change. The present bias is also not without consequences in terms 
of externalities. In fact, Winkler (2006) showed that in the presence of hyperbolic discounting, there 
is a potential conflict between economic efficiency and intergenerational equity in public good 
investments. Also, in the framework of intergenerational renewable resource harvesting, the present 
bias generates negative externalities on the welfare of future generations, reducing the resource 
stock in the presence of other-regarding preferences of the present generation when the naive 
agent’s behavior has no commitment (Persichina, 2016). Moreover, the present bias also affects the 
agent’s decisions in the exploitation of resources in terms of disruption of cooperative behaviors. In 
fact, the present-biased preferences can trigger a strategy that directs the community to excessively 
increase the harvesting level even in the presence of cooperative intentions because the behavior of 
naïve agents can activate a dynamic of cascading defections from the cooperative strategy 
(Persichina, 2016). Besides, under the hyperbolic discount, the undesired collapse of the natural 
resources can occur if the agent is naive (Hepburn, et al., 2010).  
 
3. Roots of present bias and the dual system of discounting 
 
An evolutionary origin seems to be involved in the existence of the present bias. In fact, some 
authors assign the existence of myopic behaviors and present biased preferences to evolutionary 
pressure (Godwy, et al., 2013); for example, Dasgupta and Maskin (2005) argue that incertitude and 
waiting costs have contributed to the emerging of present-biased behaviors. Furthermore, there is 
evidence that the evolutionary components of these behavioral features are widely rooted in human 
and non-human animals (Ainslie, 1974; Green & Myerson, 1996).2 
Evidence exists that shows the ability to ordinate the numbers in a correct cardinal order is not an 
innate ability of humans, confirming these ancestral roots (Godwy, et al., 2013). In fact, studies 
                                                 
2 In particular, humans show more care about the future consequences of their actions in compassion with other animals 
(Frederick, et al., 2002). Some primates show a capability to wait patiently in order to obtain rewards that is not present 
in other species (Rosati, et al., 2007) . 
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conducted on indigenous populations of Amazonia show that these populations do not have an 
exactly numeric ordering, although they have a non-verbal numerical sense. Therefore, when they 
have to define a spatial ordering for increasing quantities, the space interval between the numbers 
becomes smaller and smaller (Pica, et al., 2004). Conversely, American adults offer a spatial 
ordering that shows an equidistant space between the numbers; the logarithmic spatial ordering of 
the Amazonian populations made them similar to kindergarten pupils who only in the second year 
of school arrive spacing the numbers equidistantly (Stiegler & Booth, 2004). 
However, this result may not appear directly related to the intertemporal discounting, but as 
underlined by Godwy et al. (2013), these results effectively suggest that the non-constant discount 
has deep origins in the human behavior. Some research in the fields of cognitive neuroscience 
support a non-constant discount rate and find two different routes designed to process the 
discounting: one for immediate rewards and another for the delayed ones. In particular, two distinct 
brain areas related to the definition of intertemporal choices are identified (McClure, et al., 2004). 
The first area, namely the limbic and paralimbic, is an area of the brain that is heavily innervated by 
the dopaminergic system and is connected to short-term rewards (Breiter & Rosen, 1999; Knutson, 
et al., 2001; McClure, et al., 2003), while the other area belongs to the frontoparietal region, an area 
that supports higher cognitive functions (Loewenstein, et al., 2008). Moreover, in the field of 
cognitive neuroscience, some experiments show the activation of the limbic circuit just before 
choices that provide an immediate reward (McClure, et al., 2004); similar conclusions have been 
reached by Hariri et al. (2006) and McClure et al. (2007). 
 
In this discussion, it is worth mentioning that the limbic system is the seat of reaction processes that 
are impulsive and emotional (Hariri, et al., 2000; Pattij & Vanderschuren, 2008), and the limbic 
system — which is the most ancient part of the human brain — also includes the amygdala 
(Isaacson, 1974) whose functions are significantly correlated with emotional activities (Cardinala, 
et al., 2002; Hariri, et al., 2002). Conversely, in the presence of choices that reflect deeper 
consideration for future gains, there is not the prevalent activation of the limbic system, compared 
to the activation of the areas afferent to the neocortex (McClure, et al., 2004). The neocortex, 
exclusive to mammals, is the most recently formed brain area from an evolutionary perspective. The 
neocortex’s areas are markedly developed in humans (Rachlin, 1989) and play a role in appropriate, 
deliberative cognitive activities (Miller & Cohen, 2001; Smith & Jonides, 1999). It is, therefore, 
possible to assume that consumer choices in an intertemporal context define a dualism between the 
limbic system — whose responses are characterized by rapid impulsivity and emotion — with a 
prevalent activation of this system in response to short-term choices, and the deliberative–cognitive 
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system, afferent to areas of the neocortex, which is slower and more weighted. 
 
The joint involvement of the two systems in the decision-making process is further supported by 
Bechara (2005), Bechara et al. (1999), Damasio (1994), and LeDoux (1996). It has defined a 
distinction between the two systems of response to short and long-term stimuli, where the 
information about immediate rewards is subjected to the substantial involvement of the impulsive 
system, while a more appropriate reflective system refers to decisions about long-run rewards. 
Therefore, it is congruous to assert that the intertemporal decision-making process and the time 
inconsistency that comes out from this process is driven by the interaction of these two coexistent 
systems, coherently with the complexity of human nature (Shefrin & Thaler, 1988; Loewenstein, 
1996; Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999). 
 
The wide variety of fields and contexts in which the present bias emerges, the evolutionary 
hypothesis, the psychological foundations, and the systematic manifestations of the phenomena of 
procrastination and over-consumption, and the presence of impatience, temptation, and lacks in 
self-control, clearly outline a profile of the economic behavior that resides outside the barriers of the 
pure rational behavior. Hence, the present bias is a specific peculiarity of decisional heuristics about 
intertemporal choices in contexts where the long-run plans can be subject to revision over the short 
run and where the long-run outcomes depend on a continuum of instantaneous or short-run choices. 
Frequently, resource dilemmas have the characteristics of the context just cited. In fact, resource 
dilemmas define a situation in which long-run and short choices can come into conflict, exposing 
the agent to the risks related to the present bias; in particular, in the context of the exploitation of 
renewable resources. 
 
4. Decreasing in agent’s welfare due to the present bias 
 
The harvesting model concerns the exploitation of a stock of renewable resources, R(t). The 
dynamic of the growth of resources is given by the following equation: 
𝑅(𝑡 + 1) − 𝑅(𝑡) = 𝑓(𝑔, 𝑅(𝑡))𝑅(𝑡) − ℎ(𝑡), (1) 
where 𝑓(𝑔, 𝑅(𝑡)) ≥ 0, with the constant g > 0,3 is the growth rate, and h(t) is the harvested amount 
at time t such that the stock of resources is reduced over time, dR/dt < 0, when the exploitation rate 
                                                 
3 R(0) > 0 implies f(g, R(0)) > 0, and R(t) = 0 implies f(g, R(t)) = 0. 
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exceeds the natural growth rate, h(t)/R(t) > f(g,R(t)).4 The interval from 0 to T is the lifetime of the 
agent. In this model, the resources are materials; consequently, it is not possible to have a negative 
stock of resources: 
𝑅(𝑡) ≥ 0   ∀  𝑡 ∈ [0, 𝑇] with  𝑅0 > 0, (2) 
where R0 is the initial stock at time 0. The strictly positive initial stock and the growth rate are 
known by the agent, the amount harvested is not restorable in the stock of renewable resources, 
such that: 
ℎ(𝑡) ≥ 0    ∀  𝑡 ∈ [0, 𝑇]. (3) 
Moreover, the agent is subjected to a capacity constraint and a resource constraint. The capacity 
constraint implies that in each period, the agent cannot harvest an amount of resources greater than 
hmax, a value that is strictly positive and finite, such that, considering the non-restorable condition: 
0 ≤ ℎ(𝑡) ≤ ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑥    ∀ 𝑡 ∈ [0, 𝑇]   with  ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑥 > 0. (4) 
Instead, the resource constraint implies that the agent cannot harvest at time t more than the amount 
of resource stock available: 
ℎ(𝑡) ≤ 𝑅(𝑡)  ∀ 𝑡 ∈ [0, 𝑇]. (5) 
 
In the model, there is not an exchange market, so the agent’s welfare depends only on the amount 
harvested and enjoyed in each time. The utility function of the agent is defined in the usual manner: 
𝑈 =∑𝛿(𝑡)𝑢(ℎ(𝑡)),
𝑇
𝑡=0
 (6) 
where 𝑢(ℎ(𝑡)) is monotonic and strictly concave on ℎ(𝑡) in the interval [0, hmax]: 
𝑢′(ℎ𝑡) > 0   𝑢
′′(ℎ𝑡) < 0. (7) 
The discount factor 𝛿(𝑡) represents the degree of impatience of the agents,5 such that: 
𝛿(𝑡)
𝛿(𝑡+1)
> 1  ∀ 𝑡 ∈ (0, 𝑇), (8) 
Continuity for the harvesting amount on the interval [0, hmax] is assumed. Finally, the system 
defined excludes the situation where there is no possible reduction of the stock of resources. This 
                                                 
4  When ∂f(g,R(t))/∂R(t) = 0, the growth rate is a constant exponential one. 
5 The assumptions exclude the case of pleasure in procrastination, 𝛿′(𝑡) > 0, and neutrality in the harvesting time, 
which implies 𝛿′(𝑡) = 0 with
𝛿(𝑡)
𝛿(𝑡+1)
= 1    ∀ 𝑡 ∈ (0, 𝑇). 
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context is characterized by the impossibility for the agent to avoid total exploitation of the resources 
before the end of his lifetime if he continuously harvests the amount hmax in each period. Defining 
with 𝐻𝑖 = {ℎ𝑖(0), . . . , ℎ𝑖(𝑡), . . . , ℎ𝑖(𝑇)} a generic harvesting profile inside the set of all the feasible 
harvesting plans, 𝐻𝑖 ∈ {𝐻}, given  𝑅0, 𝑔, 𝑓(𝑔, 𝑅(𝑡)), gives: 
∄ 𝐻 𝑖 ∈ 𝐻 ∶  ℎ𝑖(𝑡) = ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑥  ∀ 𝑡 ∈ [0, 𝑇]. (9) 
Equation (9) implies that in at least one period, ℎ(𝑡) < ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑥. Considering that the agent tends to 
distribute his consumption over the time, it is assumed that the agent’s intertemporal preferences are 
given such that: 
𝐻𝑜𝑝𝑡 = {ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(0),… , ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡𝑏),… , ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑠)… , ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑇) |
0 < ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡𝑏) < ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑥
∧
0 < ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑠) < ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑥
}. (10) 
Therefore, at time 0, the agent will formulate the harvesting plan, avoiding planning harvesting 
amounts equal to hmax in each period until time 𝑡𝑏 if this implies zero harvesting in a future period. 
This is consistent with the dependency of the welfare from the harvested amount at each time, 
generating utility only in the period in which the amount is harvested. Therefore, at time 0, the 
agent formulates his optimal harvesting plan: 
𝐻𝑜𝑝𝑡 = {ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(0), . . . , ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡𝑏), . . . , ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑇)}. (11) 
The optimal harvesting plan evaluated in the absence of present bias guarantees time consistency of 
the future decisions and corresponds to the long-run harvesting plan for the agent evaluated at time 
0. In fact, in the standard rational model, the agent can accurately define his exact optimal path of 
harvesting, keeping his bond with the initial optimal plan formulated at the beginning, and he will 
do this throughout his life. As described before, this implies that the discount factor must be 
expressed in an exponential manner that guarantees time consistency; but, present bias makes an 
exponential discount factor impossible.  
An agent shows present-biased preferences at time t when the following hold: 
{
 
 
𝛿𝑡
𝛿𝑡+1
>
𝛿𝑠
𝛿𝑠+1
      with   𝑡 < 𝑠   and   𝑠 ∈ [1, 𝑇]  for 𝑡 = 0,
𝛿𝑡
𝛿𝑡+1
=
𝛿𝑠
𝛿𝑠+1
      with   𝑡 < 𝑠   and   𝑡, 𝑠 ∈ [1, 𝑇]  for 𝑡 > 0.
 (12) 
When the agent’s preferences incorporate the properties of the non-constant discount factor just 
enounced, the process of maximization can lead the agent to a different harvesting plan with respect 
to that one predicted at time 0, 𝐻𝑜𝑝𝑡. In this case, the harvesting plan of the agent is defined with the 
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amounts that are derived time after time by the instantaneous maximization of the utility function 
under the same condition of 𝐻𝑜𝑝𝑡 but with a non-constant discount rate. The resulting plan is 
labelled as a biased harvesting plan, 𝐻𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠, and defined as: 
𝐻𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠 = {ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(0), . . . , ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑡𝑏), . . . , ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑇)}. (13) 
 
A discount factor like that one expressed in the equation (12) determines the typical situation of 
time inconsistency.6 The consequences are expressed in the following postulate: 
Postulate 1: If it is solved at time t, t < 𝑡𝑏 with 
𝛿𝑡𝑏
𝛿𝑡𝑏+1
=
𝛿𝑡𝑏+1
𝛿𝑡𝑏+2
, the problem of intertemporal 
optimization in the interval [𝑡𝑏,T], with an existent unique optimal solution, then: 
𝐻𝑡 = {𝐸[ℎ(𝑡𝑏)]𝑡, . . . , 𝐸[ℎ(𝑡𝑏 + 1)]𝑡, . . . , 𝐸[ℎ(𝑇)]𝑡}, where 𝐸[ℎ(𝑡𝑏)]𝑡 is the expected harvesting 
amount for time 𝑡𝑏 with 𝐸[ℎ(𝑡𝑏)]𝑡 < 𝑅(𝑡𝑏) and 𝐸[ℎ(𝑡𝑏)]𝑡 < ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑥 .  
Then, if at time 𝑡𝑏, the same optimization problem is solved in the interval [𝑡𝑏,T] with the optimal 
solution, 
𝐻𝑠 = {ℎ(𝑡𝑏), . . . , 𝐸[ℎ(𝑡𝑏 + 1)]𝑡𝑏 , . . . , 𝐸[ℎ(𝑇)]𝑡𝑏};  
if a time 𝑡𝑏 ,
𝛿𝑡𝑏
𝛿𝑡𝑏+1
>
𝛿𝑡𝑏+1
𝛿𝑡𝑏+2
 with 
𝜕𝛿
𝜕𝑡
< 0, then ℎ(𝑡𝑏) > 𝐸[ℎ(𝑡𝑏)]𝑡. 
 
So, the amount effectively harvested at time 𝑡𝑏, ℎ(𝑡𝑏), is greater than the amount predicted for the 
same period when the optimal strategy was evaluated at time t, t < 𝑡𝑏. 
The implications for the harvesting plan in this model can be expressed in the following 
proposition:  
 
Proposition 1:  
There are two possible harvesting plans that can be derived by the decision making process of the 
agent, the first one, 𝐻𝑜𝑝𝑡 = {ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(0), . . . , ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡𝑏), . . . , ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑇)}, where at time tb, 
𝛿𝑡𝑏
𝛿𝑡𝑏+1
=
𝛿𝑡𝑏+1
𝛿𝑡𝑏+2
 , and 
the second one, 𝐻𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠 = {ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(0), . . . , ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑡𝑏), . . . , ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑇)}, where at time tb,  
𝛿𝑡𝑏
𝛿𝑡𝑏+1
>
𝛿𝑡𝑏+1
𝛿𝑡𝑏+2
. If 
under the assumption of present bias defined in (12) and given the conditions (9) and (10), the agent 
develops an expected harvesting amount formulated at time t, with t < tb, 0 < ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡𝑏) < ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑥, 
                                                 
6 Time consistency implies 
𝛿𝑡
𝛿𝑡+𝑛
=
𝛿𝑠
𝛿𝑠+𝑛
  ∀ 𝑡 ∈ [0, 𝑇]  and ∀ 𝑠 ∈ [0, 𝑇]. Only when the discounting strictly respects this 
condition will the agent’s evaluation of the optimal strategy in every period s between 0 and T lead to the same optimal 
harvesting strategy evaluated in any period t in [0, 𝑇]. 
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then in the time interval [0,T], there exists at least one period, tb, such that: 
ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑡𝑏) > ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡𝑏) with ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡𝑏) ∈ 𝐻𝑜𝑝𝑡 and ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑡𝑏) ∈ 𝐻𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠. (14) 
 
Thus, the present bias induces the agent to harvest an amount greater than the optimal one evaluated 
without the bias, prompting the agent outside from the optimal harvesting path. So, by inducing the 
reevaluation of the amount harvested at time 𝑡𝑏, the present bias generates a differentiation between 
the two possible harvesting plans of the agent. Now, the question is, does a different harvesting 
profile determined by the present bias imply a reduction of the agent’s welfare, and if so, does it 
happen because of the present-bias?  
 
The agent faces two different harvesting plans that respond to two different systems of discounting: 
- 1 - The plan that responds to the short-run, expressed by Hbias, where the amount harvested at each 
period is affected by the present bias re-evaluating the harvesting plan time after time, and - 2 - the 
long-run plan, Hopt, where the plan of harvesting formulated at time zero excludes the effect of the 
present bias and is confirmed each time. 
To compare the two plans in terms of the agent’s welfare, referring to the concept of total utility of 
the agent is necessary. In particular, it is useful to separate the concept of decision utility from 
hedonistic pleasure derived by the instant utility enjoyed by the agent (Kahneman & Sugden, 2005). 
In this sense, the concept of utility is defined following utilitarian philosophers such as Bentham, 
where utility is logically separated from what choices are made (Read, 2007). The instant utility is 
the hedonic value of a moment of experience utility (Kahneman & Thaler, 2006), such that the total 
utility is derived by a temporal profile of instant utilities. Following this approach, a time-neutral 
weighting of the outcomes is considered (Kahneman, et al., 1997). Hence, the total utility of the 
period [0,T] is given by the sum of the instant utilities of the period, allowing the total utility to be 
expressed as 𝜋 and given by: 
𝜋 =∑𝑢(ℎ(𝑡)),
𝑇
𝑡=0
 (15) 
such that the agent’s welfare is evaluated by the comparison of the different profiles of the total 
instant utility. 
 
The comparison of the level of total utility between the optimal long-run plan and the biased short-
run shows that the agent’s utility is greater in the optimal harvesting plan. In fact, the utility derived 
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by the increase in the harvesting at time 𝑡𝑏, determined by the present bias, is inferior to the 
decreased utility given by the difference between the total amount that will be harvested following 
the optimal harvesting plan and the amount that will be effectively harvested under the present-bias 
hypothesis such that: 
𝑢(ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑡𝑏)) − 𝑢 (ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡𝑏)) < ∑ {𝑢 (ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡)) − 𝑢(ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑡))}
𝑇
𝑡=𝑡𝑏+1
. (16) 
Therefore, the increased utility derived by a higher amount in the present is less than the decreased 
utility derived from the amount enjoyed in the future.7  
 
Besides, the present bias is the element that generates the reduction of the agent’s welfare. In order 
to show this assentation, it is helpful to use the utility function with present bias preferences that 
offers the essential peculiarity of the present biased discount.8 The present biased preferences are 
then expressed in the following intertemporal utility function: 
𝑈𝑡 = 𝑢(ℎ(𝑡)) + 𝛽∑𝛿
𝜏𝑢(ℎ(𝑡 + 𝜏)),
𝑇−𝑡
𝜏=1
 (17) 
where β, not greater than 1, represents the present bias. When β = 1 the discounting guarantees time 
consistency (absence of present bias) with an exponential discount factor, consequently the optimal 
harvesting plan is determined. It is trivial to show that when β is less than 1, (12) holds.  
Hence, {H} is defined as the set of all possible harvesting profiles, and a generic profile is defined 
as Hi ={hi(0),…, hi(t),…,hi(T)} because the harvesting profile derived from the biased harvesting 
plan, Hbias, is a profile inside {H} and it is alternative to Hopt at time 0 it will be 𝐻𝑜𝑝𝑡 ≻ 𝐻𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠 such 
that: 
𝑢 (ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(0)) +∑𝛽𝛿
𝑡𝑢 (ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡)) 
𝑇
𝑡=1
> 𝑢(ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(0)) +∑𝛽𝛿
𝑡𝑢(ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑡)) .
𝑇
𝑡=1
 (18) 
Because 𝑢(ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(0)) =  𝑢 (ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(0)) and because of how it is asserted in the first proposition, there 
exists at least one time 𝑡𝑏 such that 𝑢(ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑡𝑏)) >  𝑢 (ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡𝑏)), and so assuming that 𝑡𝑏 is the 
first period in which (14) holds, then, 
                                                 
7 The proof is provided in the appendix. 
8 This form of present biased preferences was originally used by Phelps and Pollak (1968) in the intergenerational 
context. 
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𝑢(ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑡)) =  𝑢 (ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡)) ∀  𝑡 < 𝑡𝑏 . (19) 
Consequently, at time 0, ∑ 𝛽𝛿𝑡𝑢 (ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡)) 
𝑇
𝑡=𝑡𝑏 > ∑ 𝛽𝛿
𝑡𝑢(ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑡)) 
𝑇
𝑡=𝑡𝑏 implies that, 
𝑢 (ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡𝑏)) + ∑ 𝛿
𝑡−𝑡𝑏𝑢 (ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡)) 
𝑇
𝑡=𝑡𝑏+1
>  𝑢(ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑡𝑏)) + ∑ 𝛿
𝑡−𝑡𝑏𝑢(ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑡)) 
𝑇
𝑡=𝑡𝑏+1
. (20) 
Because the agent faces an intertemporal decision-making process in which at each time he defines 
his harvesting amount, at time 𝑡𝑏, he will reevaluate his harvesting profile, choosing an amount 
𝑢(ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑡𝑏)) >  𝑢 (ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡𝑏)) because at this time 𝐻𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠 ≻ 𝐻𝑜𝑝𝑡. This implies that at time 𝑡𝑏, 
𝑢(ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑡𝑏)) + ∑ 𝛽𝛿
𝑡−𝑡𝑏𝑢(ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑡)) 
𝑇
𝑡=𝑡𝑏+1
>  𝑢 (ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡𝑏)) + ∑ 𝛽𝛿
𝑡−𝑡𝑏𝑢 (ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡)) 
𝑇
𝑡=𝑡𝑏+1
. (21) 
Consequently, 
𝛽 <
𝑢(ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑡𝑏))− 𝑢(ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡𝑏))
∑ 𝛿𝑡−𝑡𝑏𝑢(ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡)) 
𝑇
𝑡=𝑡𝑏+1
−∑ 𝛿𝑡−𝑡𝑏𝑢(ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑡)) 
𝑇
𝑡=𝑡𝑏+1
 . (22) 
 
Because (20) implies that 
𝑢(ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑡𝑏))− 𝑢(ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡𝑏))
∑ 𝛿𝑡−𝑡𝑏𝑢(ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡)) 
𝑇
𝑡=𝑡𝑏+1
−∑ 𝛿𝑡−𝑡𝑏𝑢(ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑡)) 
𝑇
𝑡=𝑡𝑏+1
< 1, (22) can be true only if 
𝛽 < 1. This shows that the strategy 𝐻𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠, which leads to a total utility enjoyed that is lower that 
𝐻𝑜𝑝𝑡, can be implemented only if a non-exponential time discount is adopted. 
 
The consequence of the present-bias on the agent’s welfare when he faces the tasks of intertemporal 
harvesting of renewable resources can then be summarized in the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 2: Given the utility function of the agent expressed in (17), with 𝛽 ≤ 1, two possible 
harvesting plans can be derived by the decision making process of the agent: the first one, 𝐻𝑜𝑝𝑡 =
{ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(0), . . . , ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡𝑏), . . . , ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑇)}, in which 𝛽 = 1, and the second one, 𝐻𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠 =
{ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(0), . . . , ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑡𝑏), . . . , ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑇)}, in which 𝛽 < 1. The adoption of the plan 𝐻𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠 leads the 
agent to obtain a total utility lower than in the plan evaluated at time 0, 𝐻𝑜𝑝𝑡, such that, 
∑ 𝑢(ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑡)) < ∑ 𝑢 (ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡))
𝑇
𝑡=0
𝑇
𝑡=0 . (23) 
 
The strategy 𝐻𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠 can be implemented if an only if the discount factor applied by the agent 
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incorporates the peculiarities of the present bias. Hence, between the short-run biased harvesting 
plan and the long-run optimal one, it is the second that generates higher welfare for the agent. 
 
5. Conclusion and final remarks 
 
This paper has defined a discount system that is expressed by the coexistence of two discount 
forms, an emotional, rapid, and impulsive system for responding to short-term stimuli and a 
reflective system suitable for the long term. This system of intertemporal discounting is consistent 
with — and is a part of — the complexity of decision-making that characterizes human beings, who 
respond to the simultaneous existence of a highly integrated decision-making system composed of 
two main circuits: the affective-emotional, where the emotional component is predominant in the 
dynamics of decision-making and the cognitive–deliberative, which is delegated to greater 
mediation in defining what actions to take given the input received. In this system, a conflict 
between the long-run and the short-run in the decision output can occur. The reason for the 
involvement of the present bias in this conflict has been presented and discussed. The discount 
system in which two potential discount patterns coexist — the long-run with the constant discount 
rate and the short-run with the non-constant discount — generates two different harvesting plans 
that both arise from the intertemporal preferences of the agent: two mutually excludable harvesting 
plans — the optimal harvesting path and the biased plan. The paper has shown that the first plan 
leads to greater welfare for the agent. In fact, in the long-run harvesting plan evaluated under the 
constant discount rate, the welfare of the individual is defined by the amount harvested in each 
period, ignoring that the amounts defined time after time are affected by the emotional component 
of the decision-making system underlying the present-bias. In fact, the optimal long-run harvesting 
plan is the result of intertemporal choices weighted by the interaction between the cognitive–
deliberative system and the emotional-affective one. 
 
Before this investigation, the relationship between the present-bias and the agent's welfare has not 
been adequately explored in the literature. In fact, studies on specific applications involving the 
management of renewable resource stocks, when addressing the basic question of behavior and 
decisions related to harvesting by naive agents, have focused on the effects in terms of resource 
management efficiency and resource conservation or depletion, implicitly assuming that the agent's 
choices will always maximize his utility. This implicit assumption, which in fact ignores the impact 
of the present bias on welfare, derives from not considering the naive biased/not-biased agent 
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dichotomy as an element of an individual agent's system of preferences. In fact, addressing issues 
on the lifetime welfare of individuals involved in managing renewable resources inevitably involves 
contraposition that can be defined as a conflict of choices between those that are biased by current 
emotions and those of well-being. The second kind of choice is defined in the absence of present 
bias, that is when the system of intertemporal discounting is oriented toward overall well-being. 
Conversely, present-biased choices lead individuals to a calculation that is very oriented toward the 
short term and disregards their long-run preferences. This conflict is part of the decision process of 
the agent with the dichotomy biased/no-biased choices in the process of realization of the agent’s 
preferences. 
 
This paper makes it possible to assert that in the decision-making that involves intertemporal 
choices in renewable resources management, the prevalence of naive behavior, strongly influenced 
by the emotional-affective system, leads to a reduction in the lifetime utility enjoyed by the 
individual because of the present bias. In fact, the comparison of the two harvesting plans has 
shown that the utility derived by the increase in the instantaneous utility determined in the present 
by the present bias, is inferior to the future decrease in utility determined by the adoption of the 
biased harvesting plan instead of the optimal one. These conclusions pose a serious question about 
the effective intertemporal maximization of the well-being of the agent when he adopts a present 
biased harvesting behavior. It should be noted that a harvesting plan derived from present bias could 
be not sufficient to allow a definition of effective maximization of the individual's overall well-
being when he is in a condition in which he cannot cope with the excessive impulsive component in 
the immediate present.  
These results undermine the principle for which an individual, if naïve, will correctly maximize his 
overall well-being according to his long-run preferences independently from his ability or 
possibility to commit his behaviors. Hence, the reduced welfare derived from the implementation of 
a strategy dominated by the impulsivity inherent in present bias, highlights problems that are 
relevant to maintaining a given level of resources but also shows the need to identify tools that can 
ensure effective implementation of strategies to neutralize the effects of present bias during the 
management of renewable resources. In the context in which the agent faces the risk of making 
decisions on the spur of the present bias, suitable nudges or instruments are required to offer to the 
agent the possibility to commit his harvesting plan and having the true possibility to maximize his 
experienced utility in the overall periods of harvesting. 
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Appendix 
 
Proof of (16): 
 
In order to show this result, a lifetime of 3 periods is considered, such that the total utility is given 
by: 
𝜋 = 𝑢(ℎ(0)) + 𝑢(ℎ(1)) + 𝑢(ℎ(2)). 
The discount is given such that: 
𝛿(𝑡) = {
1        for 𝑡 = 0 
𝛽𝛿𝑡  for 𝑡 > 0
, with 𝛿 < 1. It trivial to show that this discount form respond to the 
discount factor used in the utility function in (17), and guarantees the present-bias peculiarity 
express in (12). 
 
At time 0, the harvesting plan is defined by: 
𝐻𝑜𝑝𝑡 = {ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(0), ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(1), ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(2)}, 
where 𝐻𝑜𝑝𝑡 ≻ 𝐻𝑖, ∀ 𝐻𝑖 ∈ 𝐻, and where H is the set that includes all the harvesting plans feasible by 
the agent. 
At time 1 the condition given by (14) - ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑡𝑏) > ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡𝑏)  - is verified. The agent reformulates 
his harvesting plan for the present and future periods, implementing a different strategy in these 
periods: 
𝐻𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠 = {ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(1), ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(2)}. 
But, 𝐻𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠 is one of all other feasible harvesting plans different from 𝐻𝑜𝑝𝑡, meaning that at time 0, 
𝐻𝑜𝑝𝑡 ≻ 𝐻𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠, which implies: 
𝑢(ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(0)) + 𝛽𝛿 𝑢(ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(1)) + 𝛽𝛿
2𝑢(ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(2))
> 𝑢(ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(0)) + 𝛽𝛿 𝑢(ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(1)) + 𝛽𝛿
2𝑢(ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(2)), 
thus: 
𝛽𝛿 𝑢(ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(1)) − 𝛽𝛿 𝑢(ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(1)) > 𝛽𝛿
2 𝑢(ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(2)) − 𝛽𝛿
2 𝑢(ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(2)), then, 
𝛽𝛿[𝑢(ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(1)) − 𝑢(ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(1))] < 𝛽𝛿
2[𝑢(ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(2)) − 𝑢(ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(2))], hence, 
1
𝛿
<
[𝑢(ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(2)) − 𝑢(ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(2))]
[𝑢(ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(1)) − 𝑢(ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(1))]
 . 
Because 
1
𝛿
> 1, then 
[𝑢(ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(2))−𝑢(ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(2))]
[𝑢(ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(1))−𝑢(ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(1))]
> 1. So, 
𝑢(ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(2)) − 𝑢(ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(2)) > 𝑢(ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(1)) − 𝑢(ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(1)), and finally, 
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𝑢(ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(1)) + 𝑢(ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(2)) > 𝑢(ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(1)) + 𝑢(ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(2)) such that: 
𝑢(ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(0)) + 𝑢(ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(1)) + 𝑢(ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(2)) > 𝑢(ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(0)) + 𝑢(ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(1)) + 𝑢(ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(2)), 
where 𝑢(ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(0)) = 𝑢 (ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(0)). 
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